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IABSTRACT
I
This thesis presents 'the developed taxonomy of the
I
security threats in the agent-based distributed systems.
I
Based on this taxonomy, a jset of theories is developed to 
facilitate analyzing the security threats of the mobile-
agent systems. We propose ithe idea of using the developed
I
security risk graph to model the system's vulnerabilities.
i
In a security risk graph, 'an agent or a host is a vertex
!
and their security relationships form each edge. By using
the security risk graph, wp set 'up two mathematical models
i '
to quantitatively evaluate) how secure a mobile-agent
I
distributed system is. i ,
' i
In the probabilistic model,, we calculate the Meani
Time To Failure as the characteristic measure of the
;
security between any two vertices. The Mean Time ToI ■
Failure represents the approximate time used by the 
attacker to break into the'target.
i
In the second mathematical model developed in this
I
research, we calculate thejtransition time on the shortest
path between any two vertices to evaluate the approximate
I ,
time for the attacker to reach the target. The diameter of
I
the whole system is used td represent the security measure 
of the entire system. In tliis way, we can compare the
i
security level of different! systems.
iii
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CHAPTER ONEI
BACKGROUND
i1.1 Introduction
I
Over the years computer systems have successfully
i
evolved from centralized mpnolithic computing devices
supporting static applications, into client-server
i
environments that allow complex forms of distributed
I
computing due to the advances in communication technology
I
and the occurrence of more'powerful workstations. A new 
phase of evolution is now under way in which complete
i
mobility of cooperating applications among supporting
I
platforms can form a large iscale, loosely coupled
i
distributed system. The mobile software agent is a new
i I
paradigm for structuring this new phase. A mobile agentI
[15] is a program that represents a user in a computer
I
network, and is capable of migrating autonomously from 
node to node, to perform sopie computation on behalf of the
user. Its tasks are determined by the agent application,
I '
and can range from online shopping to real-time device
1
control to distributed scientific computing. ApplicationsJ
can inject mobile agents into a network, allowing them to
I
roam the network either on a predetermined path, or one
that the agents themselves determine based on dynamically
1
Igathered information. Having accomplished their goals, the
I
agents may return to theiri "home site" in order to report
i
their results to the user. I
j
Dispatching the application to other computers i'n the
i
network can reduce the network communication overhead,I
provide access to more resources and introduce
concurrency. Despite its many practical benefits, mobile
I [_
agent technology results in significant new security
I
threats from malicious agents an,d hosts. A malicious agentI
can steal or corrupt information on its host and in other
agents as well. It
host from stealing
its states or even
security problems
is even[more difficult to prevent a
the information from an agent, changing
i |
killing jit. Therefore, solving the 
of multi-[agent' distributed systems is
I
crucial for fully utilizing its advantages. Many efforts
[5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, lj5.
I
16’, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26] have been made in this iarea.'However, as of this1 1
Iwriting there is not much work done for a quantitative
I i
evaluation on how secure an1 agent-based distributed system
I ' '
is. Most mobile agent proje'cts provide one or more
cryptographic methods to prjotect the agents or the hosts 
directly. Are these methods] effective? How effective are 
they? And how safe one system's deployment of a set of
security methods compared with another one, which has a
2
I
I
different set of security (infrastructures? These questions
ii
cannot be easily answered ^without a quantitative security
i
measurement of a system. Citations [1], [2], [6], [13],
[17] include the few attempts to quantitatively measure
the security of the distributed system. Among them, Chan
I
and Lyu [2] is the only paper that proposed a mathematical
I
model to calculate the probability of security breaching 
in mobile agent scenarios / In this thesis, we develop the
taxonomy of the security threats in mobile agent-based
|distributed system. Based bn the analysis of the differenti
security' threat situations J that 'occurred in a mobile agent
‘ i
system, we derive probabilistic and further a mathematical
■i
security model for quantitatively evaluating the security 
of an agent-based distributed system.
In this research, we use security "risk" and "threat"I
alternatively. The security "risk" is the product of the
i
level of threat with the level of vulnerability. It
i
establishes the likelihood lof a successful attack. And the
security "threat" is a potential for violation of
i
security, which exists whenj there is a circumstance, 
capability, action, or event that could breach security
and cause harm. So we use "threat" when we mention the
i
potential violation of security and use "risk" when we 
want to express the measurement of the security.
3
1.2 Related WorksII
Presently the security schemes of the most mobile-
agent systems address only the problems of protecting a
I1 I
machine from malicious agent and agents from each other. Ai
growing number of mobile-agent projects are experimenting
with techniques for protecting the underlying network from
malicious agents and protecting agents from machines [10,
20, 24, 25]. While most efforts in security fields are
devoted to cryptographic or isolation methods in
I
protecting the systems, there is an urgent need for a
j !
quantitative assessment tool to 'evaluate how effective
these methods are. There has been research which
J i
concentrates on quantitatively eyaluating the security 
level of a system [1, 2, 6,1 13, 17] .
’ i
Brocklehurst, S. and Olovssdn, T. [1] is the first
one who proposed the idea to evaluate how secure a system
is quantitatively. Their goal is' to develop a security
I
measure of a system which can quantitatively represent the
I
ability of the system to resist attacks. It relates the
1
system security with reliability.. The concepts of system
I
reliability are compared with and analogous to those in
I
security, such as, system failure vs. system breach and
!
the mean time to next failJre vs. mean effort to next 
breach, etc. By analogy with the reliability function, in
4
I■Ithe stochastic process of security breach, the
I
distribution function of the effort, e, required for next
breach is
F(e) = 1 - P( E >e) ,
where E is the mean effort to failure,IIP(E > e) is the probability of the mean effort to
Ifailure greater than the effort required for the next
breach. !
I
Continuing the work in Brocklehurst, S. and Olovsson,
I '
T. [1], Jonsson, E. and Olovsson, T. [13] conducted an
I
empirical intrusion experiment to demonstrate the typical
i
attacker's behavior. They divided the attacking processI
Iinto three phases: the learning phase, the standard attack 
phase and the innovative attack phase. The probability of
successful attacks during the learning and innovative
I I
phases are small. But it is considerably higher in the
I
standard attack phase. And The collected data shows the 
times between breaches during this phase are exponentially 
distributed. This implied tjiat traditional methods for 
reliability modeling could 'be applicable to the security 
evaluation. '
Based on the theories developed in Brocklehurst, S.
and Olovsson, T. [1] and Jonsson,' E. and Olovsson, T.
I[13], Dacier, M. et. al. [6] proposed using privilege
graphs to model the system;'s vulnerabilities and
calculating the characteristic measures of the distributed
I
system security. The most important measure of the system1
security is Mean Time To security Failure, which is
I
calculated by: j
I
MTTFk = Tk + S Pkl * MTTFki; Pkl = Zkl * Tk,
I
where k is the initial states,i ,
Pki is the conditional’ probability transition from
Istate k to state 1, '1 I
Tk is the mean sojourn time' in state k,
I '
Xki is the transition rate from state k to state 1.i
Using the ideas developed in [6], Ortalo, R. et. al. 
[17] conducted an experiment for security evaluation. They
modeled a large real system as a privilege graph
exhibiting the security vulnerabilities. A set of tools
has also been utilized to calculate the Mean Time to
Failure. They found that the corresponding measure
provides useful feedback tel the security administrators.
However, the security measure can not be always computed
1
due to the complexity of the algorithm.1I
As summarized in Table! 1, nearly all the works done
i ,
in this area are for the traditional distributed systems.i
Chan and Lyu [2] is the only one. who tried to model the 
security of mobile agent system probabilistically. Iti
! 6I .
proposed the idea about coefficient of malice ki of each
Ihost and coefficient of vulnerability of an agent v and
I
used them to calculate the probability of breaches on
agent when it travels around on each host as
j
P(breach at host i) =i 1 - exp(-Xi t±) ,i
where -Xi = vki,
Iiti is the amount of time during which the agent stays
i
on host i. [
i
The agent security E is the probability of no breach
I
at all hosts in its itinerary,
E = e -S-Xiti
Table 1. Summary of Related Works
Security model for ,
11traditional distributed
1
system
Security model for
mobile agent-based
distributed system
Dacier et. al. in [6] j
1
Chan and Lyu in [2]l
Jonsson and Olovsson in
[13] l
1
1
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I1
1.3 Purpose of the Thesis
i
With the explosive development of networking and
I
powerful workstations, the] agent-based distributed system 
technology is becoming morb and'more promising. There is a 
great advantage if we can [collect the computer's idle
processing resources by sending out agents also brings
iabout very serious security problems to us. How can we
distinguish an agent from a virus? How much privilege
i
should we grant to the agents running on our computers? 
What if the computer destroys the agents running on it?
These are only a few questions among the scores of
i
difficulties come with fascinating mobile agent technology
J i
Thus it would be ideal if we can find a way to
i
quantitatively evaluate how safe an agent is or a host
j
computer is. As discussed in the previous section, we can 
see that most of attempts to quantitatively evaluate a 
system are for the traditional distributed systems. While 
[2] is the only effort,to evaluate the security for theI
agent-based systems, it does not consider the breaches
caused by a malicious agent on the host, on other agentsI
and the underlying network' Also' due to the complexity of
] i
the agent-based system, the question of how to get the
I [
coefficient of malice and vulnerability in [2] seems to be
J ]
vague and impractical. The|purpose of the thesis was to
8
Idevelop a more practical security measure for the mobileI
agent-based distributed system. This measure can
quantitatively represent the ability of the agent-based
system to resist security attacks.
i
1.4 Contexjt of the Problem
From the empirical data collected in [13], we know
i
that most security attacks' occurred during standard attack
I-
phase. So we are concentrated on the security breach
I
behaviors in this phase. 1i
iThe second model developed 'in this thesis is mainlyi
idesigned for the system administrators who can use this
model to evaluate the system's vulnerabilities. We assume
i j
the system administrators know the topology of the whole
I
system. Thus they can use this model to monitor the
I
security of the systems mobe efficiently. If this model is
used for simulating the behavior of the real attackers, we
I
also assume that the attackers have some ways to be
I j
familiar with the distribution and connections of the 
whole system before they strart to launch any attack.
Although our work comes along with theoretical proof,
i
this thesis just proposes the mathematical evaluation
imodels. Future work needs to be done to test its
feasibility on real mobile lagent-based distributed systems.
I
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1.5 Significance of the Thesis
The agent-based systems have become more and more
!
attractive because this technology can provide us with
I
more flexibilities and abilities to solve wider range of
problems, some of which are not even solvable by using the
i I
1
classical methods. For example, in the sea-of-data
t
applications, a huge amount of information is distributed
i
among different locations.iThe information that is needed
i
by other programs can never leave these locations. Due to
the reasons, such as the ratio of the volume of
t
information and the available bandwidth, the way in which
the information is stored or the1 legal issues(like medical 
images in hospitals), the program cannot fetch the 
information back and process it.1 When we are in this kind
I
Iof scenarios, agent technology seems to be the only
Jsolution. The price we need to pay for this advanced
i ,
technology includes new sets of problems concerning the 
security. The security problem becomes even harder in the 
mobile-agent systems, where agents are not static and can
i
migrate from one environment to another to continue the
)
execution instead. 1
Currently, the. majority of the research efforts havei
been emphasized the development of safer architectures or
I
cryptographic applications to tackle the security issues
/z
10
that arise in the mobile-agent systems. But at the samei
time we also desperately njeed a method to evaluate the
iefficiency of those security architectures or systems of
cryptographic applications’. This method should be able to
■iIprovide quantitative measures indicating the security
level of each cryptographic application deployed in
1
mobile-agent systems. With]this method one can tell a 
system of cryptographic application works better than 
another by comparing thesejmeasures. The aim of this
research is to develop a security model to measure the
i'
security threat of a given [ agent'-based distributed
[
computing system and each element in the system.
iI
This research also provides, a taxonomy of the
security risks in mobile-agent distributed systems. This 
taxonomy not only helps to jgive a clear view of the
security threats in an agent-based system, but also serves
i
as the basis of the development of our probabilistic model
1
of agent-based system's security measurement.
I
The most significant Contribution of this thesis is 
that it proposes a novel concept of security risk graph
i
and uses the security risk Jgraph, to model the security 
threats in the mobile-agentj distributed system.
At the time of this writing/ there is only one paper 
about security evaluation oif the agent-based distributed
i 11
systems published by Chan and Lyu [2] . As discussed in the
related works section, due to the complicated nature of
the mobile-agent distributed systems, their model seems to
be limited in scope. There is also lack of rigorous proofs
which support the claims in the 'paper. To overcome all
these shortcomings, we provide a set of theories along
with proofs to the validity of the model developed in this 
paper. Therefore, this thesis is the first attempt to
present a complete theoretical security measurement model 
for the mobile agent-based distributed systems. Using this
model, we can get a quantitative measure to indicate how
secure an agent or a host is. Also as the first attempt in
this field of study, we can evaluate how secure the whole
system is.
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One
provides an introduction to the context of the problem,
related works, purpose of the thesis, and significance of
the thesis. Chapter Two consists of an overview and the
taxonomy of the security threats of the agent-based 
distributed systems. Chapter Three presents the
probabilistic model for agent-based system security
evaluation. Chapter Four provides an advanced mathematical
12
model for the security measurement of the mobile-agent 
systems developed in this thesis. Chapter Five gives the 
conclusion and future directions of the thesis. Finally, 
the references for the thesis are presented.
1
13
CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW AND THE TAXONOMY OF THE SECURITY
THREATS IN THE AGENT-BASED SYSTEMS
2.1 Introduction
There are many advantages in using mobile-agent
systems. By using agent technology, we can move the code 
to the remote data to avoid the difficulty of moving the f
data, especially when the data volume is very large. We
can also send out the agent to access the remote resources
without keeping the network connection alive all the time.
i
i
This is very useful when we have* weak or expensive networkI
links. Task parallelization and allowing the scalability
of processing the information are two other benefits of
using agent technology. These merits of agent technology 
are very important in the areas of telecommunication and
massive information processing. However, more security
threats emerge along with this new technology. Some of
them are inherent in agent's nature and many are due to 
its mobility. Classic concept of security to support
reliable system protection is based on the traditional
1
taxonomy of the security threats. It is difficult to study
the protection issues in the new mobile-agent scenarios.
So in this chapter, we are going to focus on the security
14
issues in the mobile-agents systems and develop a security
threats taxonomy on which we base our security model in
this new paradigm.
2.2 Overview of the Security Threats in the 
Agent-based Distributed Systems
From the point of view of consequence of the security 
breaches, the traditional taxonomy of security threats
identifies three main categories [11, 21] as:
confidentiality, integrity and availability.
• Confidentiality is violated when unauthorized
principals can learn protected information. It includes 3 
subcategories of threats, they are: anonymity, 
traceability and traffic analysis. Common confidentiality 
breaches are eavesdropping, password guessing, 
masquerading or no password protection, etc.
• Integrity is infringed when unauthorized principals
modify information. The frequent integrity threats are 
having improper write access, such as the ability to 
intercept or alter the information, or interference with
the communication, etc.
• Availability is breached when the system is
prevented from performing its intended function. Some
common availability security risks are taking all the CPU
15
cycles to denial of service or jamming the communication
channel, etc.
From the point of view of relationships between the
actors in the mobile-agent systems, there are four main
categories identified [15] : threats occurred when an agent
attacks an agent platform; when an agent attacks against
other agents; when an agent platform attacks an agent, and
when an agent attacks the underlying network.
• The agent-to-host category includes the set of
threats in which agents exploit the security weakness of
Ian agent platform to launch attacks against their hosts. A
malicious agent may steal or destroy the information on
I
the host. It can also masqueradei as another agent to the
platform. Because the incoming agent has access to the CPU
cycles and file systems of the host, it can install a
virus or launch denial of service attacks to the host. In
Table 2, there is a list of possible types of attacks we 
identified for the agent-to-host scenarios.
16
Table 2. List of the Security Risks for the Agent-to-host 
Scenarios
Security threat type Threat's behavior
Masquerade An unauthorized agent claims
the identity of another
agent
Resource exhaustion An agent can consume an
excessive amount of the
platform's computing
resources
Intercept/alter An unauthorized agent
obtains or change the data
or code of the host
Eave s dropp ing An unauthorized agent can1
monitor the communication of
the host and obtain the
confidential information
Repudiation An agent participated in
somp transaction with the
host and later denies that
transaction took place
• The host-to-agent category represents the threats
where platforms maliciously attack the agents running on
them. Since the host controls every step in the execution 
of the agent, it can easily eavesdrop on the agent's 
communication with other agent or hosts, filch 
information, modify the code or state, masquerade as
another platform or deny the services to the agent. As
17
fI
I
shown in Table 3, we have a list of possible types of•I
attacks we identified when a platform launches attacks to
the agent(s).
• The agent-to-agent category represents the set of
threats in which the agents exploit security weakness to 
launch attacks to other agents. An agent participating in 
a transaction or communication may repudiate the result by 
claiming .the transaction or communication never happened.
An agent may also masquerade as .another agent to gain some
agent's trust. Or an agent may interfere with other agents 
by eavesdropping the conversation or falsifying another
agent's data or code. An agent can launch denial of
service attacks by repeatedly sending messages to another 
agent too. In Table 4, we find a list of possible types of 
attacks when an agent launches attacks to other agents.
18
Table 3. List of the Security Risks for the Host-to-agent 
Scenarios !
Security threat type Threat's behavior
Masquerade A platform pretends to be
another platform to an agent
Resource exhaustion A host deliberately consumes
a resource of an agent so
heavily that the service to
other users is disrupted
Intercept/alter A host can change, delete, or
substitute data, code or in
particular, the itinerary of
the agent(s) running on it
Eavesdropping A host can monitor the1
communication of the agent
and obtain the confidential
information
Repudiation A platform participated in
some transaction with the
agent and later denies that
transaction took place
Killing an agent A malicious platform destroys
the running agent on it
False system calls
return values
A host returns the wrong
values for the system calls
initiated by the agents
running on it
Replay A copy of previously sent
agent is retransmitted for
malicious purpose
19
Table 4. List of the Security Threats for the 
Agent-to-agent Scenarios
Security threat type Threat's behavior
Masquerade An unauthorized agent claims
the- identity of another
agent
Resource exhaustion An agent deliberately
consumes a resource of other
agents so heavily that the
service to other users is
disrupted
Intercept/alter An agent can change, delete,
or substitute data, code of
the]other agents
Eavesdropping An agent can monitor the
communication between the
other agents and obtain the
confidential information
Repudiation An agent participated in
some transaction with the
other agents and later
denies that transaction took
place
Replay A copy of previously sent
agent is retransmitted for
malicious purpose
Killing an agent An unauthorized agent has
the possibility to end the
life of other agents
20
• The agent-to-network class represents the set of
threats in which the malicious agents get control of the
underlying network and attack the normal communication of
the network. An agent may consume excessive resources in
the network by roaming through the network forever or
creating endless children to exhaust the network
resources. As shown in Table 5, we have a list of possible
types of attacks identified when an agent launches attacks
to the underlying network.
Table 5. List of the Security Threats for the 
Agent-to-network Scenarios
Security threat type Threat's behavior1
Masquerade An unlauthorized agent claims
the identity of another agent
Resource exhaustion An ag'ent deliberately consumes1
a resource of the underlying
network so heavily that the
service to other users is
disrupted
Intercept/alter An ag'ent can change, delete,
or substitute data, code
transmitted through the
underlying network
Eavesdropping An agent can monitor the
communication traversed
through the network and obtain
the confidential information
21
2.3 A Taxonomy of the Security Breaches in the 
Mobile-agent Systems
As we can see from Tables 2, 3 and 4, for the mobile-
agent systems, we have a new type of security threat-
■1
repudiation, i.e., when one party to a communication
exchange or transaction later denies that the transaction
or exchange took place. Since the repudiation relates with
the trust and credit history, we name a category of 
security threats to which it belongs as creditability.
Therefore, now we have four categories of security threats 
in the agent-based systems from the point of view of the
consequence of the security breaches. They are:
confidentiality, integrity, availability and
creditability. Here we define the creditability as
following:
• Creditability is violated when principals deny
having performed a particular action. The most common
breaches of creditability is repudiation and using some
programs owned by others, etc.
The basic elements in a mobile-agent distributed
system are the agents and the hosts. The hosts along with 
the underlying networks are the basic environment for the 
agents to execute. A host consists of a directory service,
an agent manager and a message transport service.
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Agents are software units executing on the hosts on
behalf of their owners. Agents can be mobile or static,
depending on the need of the agent's tasks.
Based on this structural characteristic of the agent-
based systems, we can partition the security threats into
two broader categories. As shown in Figure 1, security
threats can be towards the host or towards the agent. They
both have two subcategories as shown:
• the security breaches towards the hosts:
I
• the malicious agent against agent platform
I
• against the underlying networkI
I• the security breaches towards the agents:
I,
• the malicious host against agent
• agent against other agents
I
I
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Security threats 
. in agent system
Figure 1. Taxonomy of the Security Threats for 
the Agent-based Systems
For each subcategories of the security threats, it
also violates one of the four security requirements from 
the point of view of the consequence of the security 
breaches except for the agent-against-network category. As 
shown in Figure 1, the agent-against-network category will 
not violate the creditability security threat. If an agent
has used the network to transfer'information through the1
network connections, it has no possibility to deny that it
has used the service.
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From the taxonomy in Figure 1, we can develop the 
security model by differentiating the security risks of a 
host from those of an agent.
I
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CHAPTER THREE
A PROBABILISTIC MODEL' FOR AGENT-BASED
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM SECURITY THREAT EVALUATION
3.1 Introduction
Based on the taxonomy of security threats in the
mobile-agent distributed systems, we design a
probabilistic model for evaluating the security threats of
I
the agents and hosts in the agent-based distributed
systems.
Even though Chan and Lyu [£] have attempted to 
evaluate the security for the agent-based systems, their
consideration does not include the security threats of
agent-against-host, agent-against-agent and agent-against-
I
network scenarios. Also the concepts of the coefficient of
i
malice and vulnerability in Chan'and Lyu [2] are not well
defined in how to obtain the coefficient of malice andI
vulnerability is not clear. In this chapter, we develop a 
probabilistic security model in which all of the 4
security categories identified in the mobile agent system 
are taken into consideration. We.develop the security risk
I
graph and use it to set up a probabilistic model to
i
evaluate the security of the mobile-agent systems
quantitatively. i
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3.2 Introduction of the Security Risk Graph 
The basic idea is to use a graph to describe the
security threats that exist in an agent-based system.
Graphs are used because they are well defined
algorithmically and mathematically. The notations used in
graphs are well known and easily adapted to the model we
developed. We start by giving list of fundamental
definitions. A security risk graph consists of a set of
vertices and edges.
Definition 1. A vertex of a security risk graph is an 
agent or a host in the agent-based distributed system.
I
Definition 2. An edge in a .security risk graph is an
I
arc from vertex X to vertex Y, represented as (X, Y).
An edge starts from vertex X and ends at vertex Y in
the security risk graph means that a method exists for X
to launch attack to Y.
J
Definition 3. A security threat of type r exists from
vertex X to vertex Y means that there exists a method for
vertex X to perform a type r attack to vertex Y.
For each type of security threat, there is an average
access time to associate with it'. We call it the
transition time of a specific type of security threat.
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Definition 4. Transition time is the time needed for
a specific type of security threat r to succeed from one 
vertex to the next vertex. '
Definition 5. Transition rate is the success rate of
the corresponding attacks, defined as the inverse of the
transition time t of the corresponding attacks.
Here the transition time or the transition rates from
one vertex to another are the parameters we need to know
before we can do our probabilistic evaluation. They can be
obtained from the statistical estimation of agent's and
host's profiles based on the analysis of the agents' and
1
hosts' behavior and of their interaction with each other.
By observing the system, we can get the transition time
(which is the inverse of transition rate) indicate how
hard for one node to perform one particular attack to
another node and assign that value to the same kind of
attack identified from the system we want to analyze.
Definition 6. The weight of each edge is the
transition time of each edge.
Definition 7. A directed path in a security risk 
graph is a sequence of vertices ialong with the edges in 
between of them such that, for any adjacent pair of edges 
ei and e-j, the ending vertex of ei is the starting vertex
I
of ej. In this thesis we call a directed path as path.
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We can now define the security risk graph, which we
can use to model the security threats in an agent-based
distributed system. 1
Definition 8. A security risk graph of an agent-based
distributed system is a directed and weighted graph G(V,E,
W) where V is a set of vertices,, W is the set of weights 
and E is a set of edges between the vertices E = (w(u,v) |
u, v G V, w£W, u ± v} .
Figure 2 shows an example of a security risk graph.
A, B, C, D and E are the vertices and the edges are
1
labeled by the security threat tiypes. Note that only when
I
a path between an attacker and Ja target exists, is there
a possibility that a security breach can occur. For
(
instance, as illustrated in Figure 2, B cannot gain any 
access to E. So B cannot be a potential attacker to E.
By formalizing this intuitive idea, we can get the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. A security threat exists from one vertex X
to another vertex Y whenever there is a path that starts
from X and ends at Y.
I
Proof: Let us consider contrapositive statement of this
Lemma. That is, "If there is no path starts from vertex X
and ends at Y, there exists no security threat from vertex 
X to Y". Since we know this reciprocal statement holds
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1) X can read files from Y (intercept);
2) X can guess Y's password;
3) X can get hold of Y's CPU cycle;
4) Y has no password;
5) Y uses a program owned by X.
I
Figure 2. An Example of a Security Risk Graph with Edges 
Labeled by Security Threats
I
and the proof follows, we deduce' that Lemma 1 is true. □
I
3.3 Security Risks Analysis 
Based on the taxonomy of the agent-based system
vulnerabilities, we can deal with the security situation
for a host and an agent separately.
Combine the security risks related with agent against 
host and agent against the underlying network, we can
analyze the security risks a host needs to consider. As
shown in the example in Figure 3, the security risks
labeled in the numerical values and a prime are the 
security breaches to the host. Thus when we analyze the
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J I
security risks of a host, we can discard all the edges
from the host to agents and some of the edges between
agents that do not count for attacking the host and the
underlying network.
We find that the masquerade is a tricky type of
security threat. Since both the agent and the host can
masquerade as another one in the same kind. When vertex X
masquerades as another vertex Y to a third vertex Z, is it
an attack to Y, or Z or both? An example can be seen in
Figure 3. In this example, agent' Bl can masquerade as
agent Al to the host. So that this attack is toward agent 
Al only, the host only or both is a question. To solve
this problem, we need to provide more notations and
definitions.
, Definition 9. We call vertex X equals vertex Y if
vertex X's behavior looks the same as vertex Y's behavior,
denoted as X = Y.
Definition 10. Masquerade is the act of imitating the 
behavior of vertex X to vertex Y under false pretense,
denoted as X(Y).
I
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11) X can guess Y's password',■
2) X can eavesdrop Y's communication with others;
3) X has write access to Y .(alteration);
4) X can masquerade as another platform to Y;
5) Y uses a program owned by X;
6) X can repudiate the result from Y;
7) X can copy and replay Y's information;
8) Y has no password;
9) X can deny the service to Y;I
1') X can read files from Y;
2') X can write files to Y;
3') X can get hold of Y's CPU cycle;
4') X can get hold of network resources;
5') X can masquerade as another agent Y to the
platform.
Figure 3. Security Risk Graph Example for Agent-based 
System
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From Definition 9 and Definition 10, we know when
vertex X masquerades as Y, its behavior looks the same as
Y's behavior, that is X(Y) = Y. '
Definition 11. The behavior of B as seen by C is
denoted as B y C.
Unlike other kind of security threats, masquerade is
a very special type of security 'threat because it has the
following characteristics. 1
Masquerade Transition Law: '
If Entity A can masquerade as Entity B to Entity C, then
I
that is an attack from Entity A to Entity C.
i .
Proof: To C, Entity B is as itself, so B y C = B.i
l
When under masquerading, Entity A acts as B, so A y C =
I
A(B) y C = B y C, 1I
because A(B) = B. 1I
So we have ByC = AyC = B. ,
Because A behaves itself to Entity C under the name of B,
to obtain the privileges of C, so that is an attack from A
to C. □
Saying that masquerade is special is because other 
types of security threats do not necessarily have this
feature. For example, If vertex A can intercept the 
information of vertex C, vertex B can also intercept the
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information of C, then A is not necessarily definitely
able to intercept the information of C. Based on this
Masquerade Transition Law, we can get and prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 . If a vertex A can masquerade as another vertex B
to the third vertex C, then this, is a security risk from A
to B, also a security risk from A to C.
Proof: First to prove this is a security risk from A to B
is trivial. Because A masquerade as B, whatever A does
has affected B's reputation. So, it is an indirect
I
security risk from A to B.
Also by using the masquerade transition law, we know it is
i
a security risk from A to C. □ 1
I
Take Figure 3 as an example1, agent Bl can masqueradeI
as agent Al to the host. So that1 is a security risk to
agent Al and to the host as well1. By using Lemma 2, we can
leave agent Bl in the graph for the analysis of the
security risks for the host. Because we discover an agent
could masquerade as another agent to the platform. We
regard it belongs to the security risks a host needs to
face, also as a security attack form between agents.
Then we can isolate the security risks the host will face,
see Figure 4.
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1) X can read files from Y .(intercept) ;
2) X can write files to Y (alteration);
3) X can get hold of Y's CPU cycle;
4) X can get hold of network resources;
5) X can masquerade as another agent Y to the
platform. 1
I
Figure 4. Security Risk Graph Analyzed the Security Risks 
of the Host h
By far, we have used an example to illustrate how to
analyze the security risks a host will face in the system 
Our basic idea is to eliminate all the unnecessary edges
and vertices to make all the connections to this host
stand out. To summarize, we can just consider the
connections to the host and the communications between
agents that can cause any breach to the host for
I
analysis of the security risks of the host.
But for analyzing the security of the agents, using 
Figure 3 as an example, we cannot just discard all the
35
possibilities in Figure 4. Because one agent can take all
host h's CPU cycles, so as to deny the service to other
I
agents. For instance, as shown in Figure 5, Ai can geti
hold of host's CPU cycle, thus launch denial of service1
attack to every agent running on host h. Note that in
I
Figure 3, we don't have the edges of type 9 from hosth to 
each agent. By the process of analyzing the security
"Towards the agent" scenarios, we found that we should add
those edges. In fact, we can gerieralize this observation
into the following theorem for analyzing the security risk
Igraph of the agent-based system.,
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1) X can guess Y's password;
1
2) X can eavesdrop Y's communication with others;
3) X has write access to Y (alteration);
4) X can masquerade as another platform to Y;
5) Y uses a program owned b]y X;
6) X can repudiate the result from Y;
7) X can copy and replay Y's information;
8) Y has no password;
9) X can deny the service to Y;
3') X can get hold of Y's CPU cycle;
4') X can get hold of network resources;
5') X can masquerade as another agent Y to the
platform.
J
Figure 5. Security Risk Graph for Agents on the Platform
I
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Theorem 1. If an agent A on host i can take all of host
i's CPU cycles, it can in turn launch denial of service
attack to all of the agents running on this host except
for A itself. If more than two agents on the same host i
can take all of i's CPU cycles, 'the first one which
launches the attack can succeed. 1I
Proof: Since all of the agents running on a host need to
I
utilize CPU cycles for its performance, if the CPU is hold
completely by one agent, then the other agents cannot
function correctly. If the first agent can get hold of all
CPU cycles successfully, all the other agents running onI1
host i can not even function correctly. They would have no 
chance to succeed in taking hold of all CPU cycles any
i
more. □ 1 •
3.4 Mathematical Quantification for Security 
Assessment
After we have developed the security risk graph of a 
system, the Markov model is chosen to quantify the
security risks of a multi-agent distributed system. Among
[
various probabilistic measures derived from the Markov
model, we use the MTTF (Mean Timle To Failure) value which
we define as follows.
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Definition 12. Mean Time To Failure is the mean
transition time for a potential attacker to reach the
specified target, denoted as MTTF.
The MTTF is obtained by summing all the mean
transition times in the edges leading to the target vertex
that each edge is weighted by the transition rate of each 
attack. The mean time in vertex j, denoted as Tj, is given 
by the inverse of the sum of vertex j's output transition
rates: I
Tj = 1/ S A. ji, 1 e out (j),,
I
where A j± is the transition rate from vertex j to 
vertex 1, and out(j) is the set of all vertices to which j 
is connected by an edge where j is the starting'point.
I
The MTTFk is the mean time £o failure when vertex k
i
is the initial vertex and Pki is ,the conditional transition
probability from vertex k to veptex 1. They are defined as
follows: i
MTTFk = Tk + 2 Pki * MTTFki;
Pkl = A, kl * T k.
Though we have set up the way to quantify the
security using the Markov model, before we can really
[
start the calculation, we have sqme more things to do. Due 
to the fact that the agent-based distributed system is
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quite different from the traditional distributed system as
we have several agents running on a single host or a host
can launch several different kinds of attacks to one
particular agent, we face a problem of how to analyze and
calculate the MTTF for this kind of situation. For
example, as shown in Figure 6, when agent B2 is the
attacker and agent Bl is the target, we have an edge loop
back to its ancestor, like hosthAi. How could we calculate
the MTTF for this scenario? In Figure 4 and Figure 5, 
agent Al can perform 3 different attacks'1 to host h (in 
Figure 4) and host h can launch 'four different attacks to
agent A2 (in Figure 5). Which ope we should choose for 
calculating Tj? In responding .to) these problems, we have
I
developed the following theorems, to handle them.
Figure 6. Security Risk Graph for B2 as the Starting Point 
and Bi the Target
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ITheorem 2. If there are several edges with the same
direction from one vertex to the next in the security risk
graph and suppose the intruders do not know the whole 
topology of the system, when calculating MTTF regarding to
these two vertices, choosing the shortest edge with theI
smallest transition time will not affect the MTTF
calculation.
Proof: Without losing generality, as seen in the security
risk graph (Figure 7), suppose A is an intruder and B as a
target. There are several edges'from A to B, ABlz AB2, ...
Abn. Each edge has a transition time tlz . . . , tn associatedI
with it. Suppose t± = min{ ti, ... tn } . Based on the
assumption in Dacier, M. et. al.’ [6], the intruders do not
know the whole topology of the security risk graph. They
only know the attacks that can be directly applied in a
single step. So A has the options tlz t2, ..., tn to attack
B. From the empirical results obtained from Jonsson, E.
and Olovsson, T. [12], the intruder A would always try to
Figure 7. Security Risk Graph for A as the Intruder and B 
as the Target
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perform the attack takes the least time which is ti. □
Theorem 3. If there is an edge from one vertex that goes
back to its ancestor, then this .edge would not be counted
in calculating MTTF.
I
Proof: From the attacker's point of view, he would choose
a route which takes the least time. Reflected in the
privilege graph, the attacker's 'goal is to choose the 
branch that takes the least time'.
Case I. Edge from one vertex goes back to its parent. 
Without losing generality, suppose there is one branch in 
the security risk graph that has an edge from one vertex 
Pi goes back to its parent Aiz as1 circled part in Figure 8I
Then the time taken by each of all the other branches is
Ijust the sum of all the edges in that branch. From the
security risk graph, we can see that if the time taken
I
from R go all the way down to T is t (t is chosen by
selecting the smallest value among different routes). Put 
if we loop back at Pi,
for route Ai - Pi, total time = t + tBii + tBn, where
tBii + tBii > 0.
So total time > t.
for route A± - Bj - Bi, total -time - t + tBij + tBji + 
tBii, where tBij + tBjl + tBn >0.
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So total time > t.
That means whatever the routes in between vertex Ai
and Bi, total time > t + tBii > t.. So when calculating 
METF, we discard the edges that 'loop back to the parent.
Figure 8. Security Risk Graph for Edge from One Vertex 
Goes Back to its Parent Case
Case II. Edge from one node goes back to its ancestor. 
Similar to case I, the time taken by the branch edge from 
one vertex n± goes back to its ancestor is greater than
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the time taken from R go all the way through Ai, ni down
to T, as in Figure 9. If t is the time taken to loop back
from nj to Ai , t > 0.'
So when calculating MTTF, we discard the edges that loop 
back to the ancestor of this vertex ni. □
Figure 9. Security Risk Graph for Edge from One Vertex 
Goes Back to its Ancestor Case
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3.5 Illustrative Example
Now let us use an example to illustrate how this
approach works. We use the example in Figure 3. Figure
10 shows that the edges are assigned different
thicknesses to represent their weight and also to
characterize the difficulty of the breaches: the
thicker the edge, the easier the breach. For the
convenience of calculation, we use one week as the unit
of attack times. So every different transition time can 
be digitally quantified ,as weeks, for instance, one day 
is approximately 0.2 we,ek. In this way, the transition 
rate for each attack is 1 divided by the corresponding
transition time. To represent very easy attacks (quasi-
instantaneous transition firing), the transition rate
is assigned a high value as 5000. Table 6 lists the 
transition time, its corresponding time in weeks,
transition rate and the graph representation in the
security risk graph for the identified transition time
of the attacks.
I
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Table 6. Transition Time, its Corresponding Time in Weeks, 
Transition Rate and Graph Representation
Transition Transition Transition Line type in
time Time in
weeks
rate the security
risk graph
Quasi­
ins tantaneous
0.0002 5000
one hour 0.02 50
one day 0.2 5
—►
one week 1 1
------- ►
one month 5 0.2
------- ►
one year 50 0.02
------- ►
To illustrate how to calculate the MTTF, we take B2
as the attacker, A2 as the target from Figure 10 andl
generate the Markov graph as in Figure 11.
I
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hosth1
1) X can guess Y's password1 in one week (one week 
-- ► ) ; I
2) X can guess Y's password in one month (one monthI
----- ► ) ; ■ •, !
3) X can eavesdrop Y's communication with others
(quasi-instantaneous e=^> ')i
4) X has write access to Y -((alteration) (quasi-
instantaneous) ; 1
5) X can masquerade as another platform to Y (one
6) Y uses a program owned by X once in a year (one
year -- ► ) ; j
7) X can repudiate the result from Y in one day (one
day -- ;
8) X can copy and replay Y's Information (quasi- 
instantaneous) ;
I
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9) Y has no password (quasi-instantaneous);
10) X can deny the service to Y in one hour;
11) X can deny the service to Y in one day;
1') X can read files from Y in one hour;
2') X can write files to Y 'in one day;
3') X can get hold of Y's CPU cycle in one hour;
4') X can get hold of network resources in one day
5') X can masquerade as another agent Y to the
platform in one month.
Figure 10. Security Risk Graph Example with Weight 
Demonstrated in Different Line Type
i
i
I
I
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2Figure 11. Markov Graph for B2 as the Attacker and A2 as 
the Target ,
i
By using Theorem 3, we can eliminate the edges BiB2,■I
to get Figure 12. Also for transition rate of edge
AiHosth we can choose the one that gives the smallest
transition time based on Theorem 2.
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Figure 12. Simplified Markov Graph for Figure 11 by Using 
Theorem 2 and Theorem' 3
IThen we can calculate MTTF ,as following:
MTTF = Ti + Pi2MTTF2 + P13MTTF3
I
Ti = 1/ (Zi + X2) = 1/ (0.02+5000) = 0.00019999I
Pi2 = Xi * Ti = 0.02 * 0.00019999 = 0.000004
P13 = X2 * Tx = 5000 *■ 0.00019999 = 0.999995
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MTTF2 = T2 = 1/ X3 +1/ X9 = 1/50 +1/50000 = 0.02 +
0.0002 = 0.0202
mttf3 = t3 + p32mttf4 + P33MTTF5I
T3 = 1/ (X4 + x5) = 1/ (50 + 5.) = 0.01818182
P32 = X4 * T3 = 50 * 0.01818182 = 0.909091
P33 = X5 * T3 = 5 * 0.01818182 = 0.0909091
MTTF4 = 1/ X7 + 1/ X3 + 1/ X'g = 1/0.2 + 1/50 +1/50000
= 5 + 0.02 + 0.0002 = 5.0202
MTTF5 = 1/ X8 = 1/0.2 = 5
MTTF3 = 0.01818182 + 0. 909091 * 5.0202 + 0.0909091 *
5 = 5.036535958
So MTTF = 0.00019999 + 0.00’0004 * 0.0202 + 0.999995 *I
5. 036535958 = 5.03671, which means the average time for
B2 to attack A2 is about 5.03671 weeks.
Part of the result is shown in Table 7. In this
table, we selected 3 vertices as target and calculated the
MTTF other attackers need to spend to reach them. The
MTTF is represented in time duration as number of weeks.
For example, take agent B2 as the attacker and agent B3 as
the target, B2 need 0.2002 weeks)to succeed one attack to
B3.
I
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Table 7. Part of the MTTF Results (in Number of Weeks) 
Calculated by Using the Proposed Method
XTarget Host h'1 a2 b3
Attacker x.
b2 -- 5.0367 0.2002
Ai 0.02 5.148 0.1984
Host h -- 0.0002 0.02
Bi 5.02 ’ 5.1745 0.8916
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESIGN OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR SECURITY
MEASURING OF AGENT-BASED DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
In this research, we found that the MTTF calculation
is complicated even only with basic security threats taken
into consideration. If we want to evaluate a large network
with numerous machines running, the calculation could be
enormous. Even for the traditional distributed systems,
Ortalo, R. et. al. [17] has proved that the calculation of
MTTF can not be computed sometimes due to the
complications by performing experiments. In order to
overcome this shortcoming, we used the shortest path
algorithm to reduce the amount of computation. Also byI
using the shortest path, we have.the method to find the
diameter of the security risk graph so that we can
evaluate the security of the whole system. The shortest
path was discussed in the study of security risks in the
traditional distributed network in Dacier, M. et, al. in
[6]. They claim that the shortest path can only be the
major contribution to the MTTF calculation. Since an
attacker does not know the whole topology of the network,
they believe that the attacker could not always take the
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shortest path. They showed that ,the mean time to reach the
i
target using MTTF calculation is, always smaller than the
value calculated using the shortest path. While the MTTF
calculation can only estimate the mean time to failure
between any two vertices, it would be more usable if we
can compare the security between two systems besides just
L
comparing between any two vertices. Especially for the
I
system administrators, after they perform some security
upgrade, they may want to compare the upgraded system
I
security with the original one to see how effective the
I
new methods are. In this Chapter1, we are going to present
an advanced mathematical model developed in the thesis by 
using the shortest path. J
4.2 An Advanced Security Model for Security 
Evaluation
As we presented in Chapter 3, we have modeled the
system's security risks using the security risk graph. 
Based on the analysis of the security threat types, we
developed Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 to identify some special
kinds of attacks and add all the necessary edges. Then the
developed Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are used to simplify the 
generated security risk graph so that we can calculate the
MTTF using Markov model. However, the MTTF calculation is
too complicated and time-consuming and sometimes not even
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computable by the ordinary computers [17]. Also our goal
is to find a way to evaluate the entire system's security
risk as opposed to finding the security risk between any
two vertices. First we need to know what a shortest path
is in a security risk graph.
Definition 13. Let P be a path containing vertices viz 
V2, ... vn, and w(v±, v3) be the weight on the edge 
connecting v± to Vj, then the length of path P is defined
as
n-1
|p| = £ w(viz vi+i) . ;
i=1
Definition 14. A shortest path from vertex u to
vertex v is defined as any path with weight 5(u, v) =
. imin{w(P) I P(u ~ v) }, where P(u ~ v) is the set of paths 
from vertex u to vertex v, and w,(P) is, the set of weights
I
of each path in P(u ~ v). f
Despite the argument in Dacier, M. et. al. in [6]
I.
that the shortest path cannot be' used for calculating the
MTTF. We assume that if there exists one or more paths
between two vertices in a security risk graph, the attack
time taken from the starting point to the target can be
represented by the sum of the transition times on the
Ishortest path. Because the time on the shortest path
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describes the least time the attacker will need to use to
break into the target. If the attacker does not know the 
topology of the whole system, the time needed to break
I
into the target will be definitely more than the time
calculated from the shortest path or at best is equal to
the time from the shortest path. Also due to the
difference between the agent-based distributed systems and
the traditional distributed systems, the attackers may
have some means to know the shortest path from the
starting point to the target or even the topology of the
I
whole system by probing the vulrierabilities first. In
either case, the shortest path is a suitable measure for
the system administrators to evaluate the system's
I
security level. 1
I
4.3 Quantification Algorithm for Security 
Measurement
1
In this section we present 'an algorithm to find the
security measure based on the Dijkstra's algorithm and use
a simple example to show how this algorithm works.
Security risks estimation algorithm:
Input: Weighted graph G, source, destination (G is the
simplified graph using Theorems 2 and 3)
Output: Transition time from source to destination
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Temp: temporary tree structure to hold the nodes and edges
as we go through graph G i
1. add source, Transition time (source) = 0 to Temp
2. while (destination g Temp)
find edge (u, v), where:
a. u e Temp;
b. v g Temp;
c. minimize the transition time over all (u, v)
satisfies a and b.
The resulted transition time = transition time(u)
+ w(u, v) , where w(u, v) is the ^weight of (u, v) .
Actually, Dijkstra algorithm can find the shortest
path to every vertex to which the source vertex has a
connection besides the target vertex. It has the same time
complexity as the one needed for just finding the shortest
path to the target.
Take Figure 12 as an example, this time we want to
use the transition time instead of the transition rate and
generate the Figure 13.
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IFigure 13. Simplified Markov Graph for Figure 12 Labeled 
by Transition Times
Following the above algorithm, the example in Figure
13 works as below:
1. Take the source vertex B2 and put it in Temp.
Temp -- {B2}
2. Since B2 connects to Ai and Dx, we mark Ai and Di
as candidates.
3. Compare | B2Ai | = 50 and | B2Di | = 0.0002. Because 
| B2Di | is smaller, we take Di into Temp. Now
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Temp - {B2, Di) and we also get the shortest path 
between B2 and Di is B2Di with | B2Di | - 0.0002.
4. Since Di is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to Di: Bi and B3. After we mark
them, our candidates are Aiz Bx and B3.
5. Compare:
| B2DiB3 | = 0.0002,+ 0.2 = 0.2002 
| B2DiBi | = 0.0002'+ 0.02 = 0.0202
| B2Ai | = 50
Because | B2DiBi ] is smaller, we take Bi into Temp 
Now Temp = {B2, Di, Bi) and the shortest pathI
between B2 and Bi is B2DiBi with | B2DiBi | = 0.0202
6. Now that Bi is in Temp, we need to consider the
I
vertices connected to Bi-: Ai. After we mark it,
our candidates are Ai, and B3.
7. Compare: 1 ; .
i
| B2D1BiA1 | = 0.000'2 + 0.02 + 5 = 5.0202I
I B2D!B3 I = 0.0002'+ 0.2 = 0.2002l L
| B2Ai | = 50 i
1Because | B2DiB3 | is smaller, we take B3 into Temp 
Now Temp = {B2, Di, Bi; Ei3} and the shortest path
I
between B2 and B3 is B2DiB3 with [ B2DiB3 | = 0.2002.
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8. Now that B3 is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to B3: A2. After we mark it,
our candidates are A2, and Ai.
9. Compare:
| B2DiBiAi | = 0.0002 + 0.02 + 5
= 5.0202
| B2D!B3A2 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 = 5.2002 
| B2Ai | = 50
Because | B2DiBiAi | is smaller, we take A3 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {B2z Di, Bi, B3, Ai) and the
shortest path between B2 [and Ai is B2DiB]Ai with1
| B2DiB!Ai | = 5.02 02. 1
10. Since Ai is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to Ai: hosth. After we mark it,
i
our candidates are'A2, and hosth.
11. Compare:
| B2DiB3A2 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 = 5.2002 
| B2Aihosth | = 50 + 0.02 = 50.02 
[ B2DiBiAihosth | = 0.0002 + 0.02 + 5 + 0.02
= 5’. 0402
Because | .B2DiBiAihosth| is smaller, we take hosth 
into Temp. Now Temp = {B2, Di, Bi, B3, Ai, hosth)
I
and the shortest path between B2 and hosth is
B2D1B1A1hosth with
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| BsDiBiAihosth | = 5.0402.
12. Since hosth is in Temp, now we need to consider
the vertices connected to hosth: A2. After we mark
it, our candidates are A2.
13. Compare:
B2DiB3A2 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 = 5.2002
B2AihosthA2 =50 + 0.02 + 0.0002 = 50 .02 02
B2DiBiA3.hosthA2 | = 0.0002 + 0.02 + 5 + 0.02
+ 0.0002
= 5.0404
Because | B2D!BiAihosthA2 | is smaller, we take A2 
into Temp. Now Temp = {B'2, Dlz Blz B3, Aiz hosth, A2}
and the shortest path between B2 and A2 is
B2D1B1A1hosthA2 with 1
| B2DiBiAihosthA2 ] = 5.0404.
I
By using the above algorithm in all these steps, we 
have found all the shortest paths starting from agent B2,
and ending to every other vertex. We illustrate those
shortest paths in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for B2 as the 
Initial Vertex '
Next let us take Ai as the initial vertex and try to
find all the shortest paths starting from Ai.
1. Take the source vertex Ai and put it ,in Temp.
I
Temp = {Ai}
2. Since Ai connects to Di and hosth, we mark Di and
I
hosth as candidates.
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0.02.3. Compare | AiDi | = 0.0002 and | Aihosth 
Because | AxDi | is smaller, we take Dx into Temp.
Now
Temp = (Ai, Di) and we also get the shortest path 
between Ai and Di is AiDi'with | A]Di | = 0.0002.
4. Since Di is in Temp, now we need to consider the 
vertices connected to Di,: Bi and B3. After we mark 
them, our candidates are, hosth, Bi and B3.
5. Compare:
I
I AiDiB3 | = 0.0002 '+ 0.2 = 0.2002 
| A1D1B3. [ = 0.0002 ,+ 0.02 = 0.0202 
| Aihosth |=0.02 '
Because | Aihosth | is smaller, we take hosth into 
Temp. Now Temp = {Ai, Di,i. hosth) and the shortest
path between Ai and hosth is Aihosth with 
| Aihosth |=0.02. 1
6. Now that hosth is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to hosth: A2, B2, Bi and B3.
After we mark them, our candidates are A2, B2, Bi
and B3.
7. Compare:
| A1D1B1 | = 0.0002 + 0.02 = 0.0202 
| AiDiB3 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002 
| AihosthB2 | = 0.02' + 0.2 = 0.22
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| AxhosthBs | = 0.02 + 0.02 = 0.04 
Because | A]DiBi | is smaller, we take Bi into Temp 
Now Temp = {Ai, Di, hosth, Bi) and the shortest 
path between Ai and Bi is A1D1B1 with | A1D1B1 | =
I
0.0202.
8. Now that Bi is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to Bi: B2. After we mark it,
our candidates are A2, B2, and B3.
9. Compare:
I
| AiDiB3 | = 0.0002.+ 0.2 = 0.2002
| AihosthB3 | = 0.02 + 0.02 = 0.04
| AihosthA2 | = 0.02 + 0.0002 = 0.0202 
Because | AihosthA2 | is smaller, we take A2 into 
Temp. Now Temp - {Ai, Dx, 1 hosth, Bf, A2} and the
shortest path between Ai and A2 is AihosthA2 with 
| AihosthA2 | = 0.0202.
10. Since A2 is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to A2Bi and hosth. Since we
have found the shortest, path for both of them, we
do not mark them. Our candidates are B2 and B3.
11. Compare:
| AiDiB3 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002
| AihosthB2 | = 0.02 + 0.2 = 0.22
| AihosthB3 | = 0.02 + 0.02 = 0.04
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1.0202| A1D1B1B2 I = 0.0002 + 0.02 + 1 =
Because | AihosthB3 [ is smaller, we take B3 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {Ai, Di, hosth, Blz A2, B3} and the
shortest path between Ai and B3 is AihosthB3 with 
| AihosthB3 | = 0.04.
12. Since B3 is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to B3|: A2. Since we have found
the shortest path for it, we do not mark it. Our
candidates are B2.
13. Compare:
| AihosthB2 | — 0.02 + 0.2 = 0.22I
| AiDiBiBs J = 0.0002 + 0.02 + 1 = 1.0202 
Because | AihosthB2 | is -smaller, we take B2 into 
Temp. Now Temp - {Alz Diz hosth, Bi, A2, B3, B2) and
the shortest path between Ai and B2 is AihosthB2 
with | AihosthB2 | = 0.22'.
From the above steps, we have found all the shortest
paths starting from agent Aiz and ending to every other
I
vertex. We illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 15.
Let us take A2 as our next initial vertex and try to 
find all the shortest paths starting from A2.
1. Take the source vertex A2 and put it in Temp.
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Temp = {A2}
Figure 15. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for Ax as the 
Initial Vertex I
I
2. Since A2 connects to Di, Bi and hosth, we mark Di,
IBi and hosth as candidates.
3. Compare
I
| A2Di | = 0.0002 ,
I
| A2hosth | =0.02;
i
| A2Bi | = 0.0002 ,
Because | A2Di | = | A2Bi | are the smallest, we
I
take Di and Bi into Temp: Now Temp = {A2, Di, Bi}1
and we also get the shortest path between A2 and 
Di is A2D]_ with ] A2Di | = .0.0002 and between A2 and 
Bi is A1B1 with | A2Bi | =.0.0002.
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4. Since Di and Bi are in Temp, now we need to
consider the vertices connected to Di and Bi: B2,
B3, Ai, Bi and hosth. After we mark some of them, 
our candidates are host^, Aiz B2 and B3.
5 . Compare:
| A2hosth 1 - 0.02 i 
| A2DiB3 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002
| A2BiB2 | = 0.0002 + 1 = 1.0002
| A2BiAi | = 0.0002 + 5 = 5.0002
Because | A2hosth | is smaller-, we take hosth into
Temp. Now Temp = {A2, Di, Bi, hosth} and the
I
shortest path between A2 and hosth is A2hosth with 
[ A2hosth |=0.02. '
6: Now that hosth is in Temp, we need to consider the
I
vertices connected to hbsth: Ai, Di, B2, Bi and B3.
After we mark some of them, our candidates are Ax,
B2 and B3 . 1
i
7 . Compare:
| A2DiB3 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002 
| A2hosthB3 | = 0.02 + 0.02 = 0.04 
| A2BiB2 ] = 0.0002'+ 1 = 1.0002 
| A2hosthB2 | =0.02 + 5 = 5.02 
| A2BiAi | = 0.0002 + 5 = 5.0002 
| A2hosthAi | = 0.02 + 0.0002 =
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0.0202
I
I
Because | A2hosthAi | is smaller, we take Ai into 
Temp. Now Temp = {A2, Di, Biz hosth, Ai) and the
shortest path between A2i and Ai is A2hosthAi with
I
| A2hosthAi | = 0.0202. i
8. Now that Ai is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to Ai: Dx and hosth. Since we
have them in the Temp already, we do not mark them.
Our candidates are B2 and B3.
9. Compare:
[.A2DiB3 | = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002 
| A2hosthB3 | = 0.02 + 0.02 = 0.04I
| A2hosthDiB3 | = 0.02 + 0.02 + 0.2 = 0.24 
| A2BiB2 | = 0.0002 + 1 = 1.0002 
| A2hosthB2 | - 0.02 + 5 - 5.02
Because ] A2hosthB3 | is smaller, we take B3 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {A2, Diz Biz hosth, Aiz B3} and the 
shortest path between A2 and B3 is A2hosthB3 with | 
A2hosthB3 ] = 0.04.
10. Now that B3 is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to B3!: A2. As we do not need to
I
mark it, our candidates are B2.
11. Compare:
| A2BiB2 | = 0.0002 ,+ 1 = 1.0002 
I A2hosthB2 I =0.02 + 5 = 5.02
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IBecause | A2BiB2 | is smaller, we take B2 into Temp. 
Now Temp = {A2, Diz Blz hosth, Aiz B3, B2} and theI
shortest path between A2 and B2 is A2BiB2 with
| A2BiB2 | = 1.0002. i
i
Thus we have found all the i shortest paths starting
from agent A2, and ending to every other vertex. We
illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for A2 as the 
Initial Vertex
Our next target is to take Bi as the initial vertex 
and try to find, all the shortest paths starting from Bi.
1. Take the source vertex Bi and put it in Temp.
Temp = {Ba.}
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2. Since Bi connects to Ai and B2, we mark Ax and B2
as candidates.
3. Compare
I BiAi | = 5
| BiB2 |=1
Because | BiB2 | = 1 is smaller, we take B2 
into Temp. Now Temp = {Bi,. B2} and we also get the
shortest path between Bi and B2 is BiB2 with 
| BiB2 | = I-.
4. Since B2 is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to B2: Ai and Di. After we mark
some of them, our candidates are Ai and Di
Compare: !
| BiAi | = 5 ;
| BiB2Ai | =1+50 = 51
| BiB2Di | = 0.0002 + 1 = 1.0002
I B1A1D1 1 = 0.0002 + 5 = 5.0002
Because | BiB2Di | is smaller, we take Di into Temp. 
Now Temp = {Bi, Di, B2} and the shortest path 
between Bx and Di is BiB2Di with | BiB2Di | = 1.0002.
6. Now that Di is in Temp, we need to consider the
I
vertices connected to Di,: B3. After we mark it,
our candidates are Ai and' B3.
7. Compare:
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I BiAi |=5 j
| BiB2Ai | = 1 + 50 != 51
| BiB2DiB3 |=1+ 0.0002 + 0.2 = 1.2002
| BiAiD^ | = 0.0002 + 5 + 0.2 = 5.2002 
Because [ BiB2DiB3 | is smaller, we take B3 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {Bi, Di) B2, B3} and the shortest 
path between Bi and B3 is BiB2DiB3 with
| BiB2DiB3 | = 1.2002. ,
8. Now that B3 is in Temp, ,we need to consider the
i
vertices connected to Bj: A2. After we mark it,
our candidates are Ai and A2.II
9. Compare: (
I BxAi |=5
| BiB2Ai I =1 + 50 = 51
I
I B1B2D1B3A2 | = 1 +' 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 = 6.2002 
Because | BiAi | is smaller, we take Ai into Temp. 
Now Temp = {Bi, Diz B2, B3z Ai) and the shortest
path between Bi and Ai is B]Ai with 
| BiAx |=5.
10. Now that Ai is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to A/: hosth and Dx. Since Dx
has already been in the Temp, so we only we mark
hosth, our candidates are hosth and A2.
11. Compare:
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I
I
6.2002
| BiAihosth | = 5 +0.02 = 5.02 
| BiB2Aihosth | = 1 ,+ 50 + 0.02 = 51.02 
| B1B2DiB3A2 | = 1 +, 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 =
i
Because | BiAihosth | is 'smaller, we take hosth 
into Temp. Now Temp - {Bi, Diz B2, B3, Alz hosth} 
and the shortest path between Bi and hosth is 
BiAihosth with | BiAihosth | =5.02.
12. Now that hosth is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to hosth: B2, B3, A2 and Di.
Since B2, B3 and Di has already in the Temp, so our
candidate is only A2.
13. Compare: I
] BiAihosthA2 I = 5'+ 0.02 + 0.02 = 5.04 
| BiB2DiB3A2 |=l+[ 0.0002 + 0.2 + 5 = 6.2002
Because | B1A1hosthA2 | is smaller, we take A2 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {Blz Dlz B2, B3, Ai, hosth, A2} and 
the shortest path between Bi and A2 is BiAihosthA2 
with | BiAihosthA2 | =5.04.
By now we have found all the shortest paths starting 
from agent Biz and ending to every other vertex. We
illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 16.
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Figure 17. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for Bi as the 
Initial Vertex
I
Next, let us analyze the situations when B3 as theI
initial vertex and try to find all the shortest paths
1
starting from B3.
1. Take the source vertex B3 and put it in Temp.
Temp = {B3}
2. Since B3 connects to A2, we mark A2 as candidate.
3. Since | B3A2 | = 5 and we have nothing to compareI
with it, we take A2 into Temp. Now Temp - {B3, A2}
and we also get the shortest path between B3 and 
A2 is B3A2 with | B3B2 | =5.
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4. Since A2 is in Temp, now we need to consider the
vertices connected to A2: Dlz Bi and hosth. After
we mark them, our candidates are Dlz hosth and Bi.
5. Compare:
| B3A2Bi |=5+ 0.0002 = 5.0002 
| B3A2Di | = 0.0002'+ 5 = 5.0002 
| B3A2hosth | = 0.2+ 5 = 5.2
Because | B3A2Di | = | B3A2Bi | are smaller, we take 
Di and Bi into Temp. Now Temp = {B3, A2, Diz Bi) .
The shortest path between B3 and Di is B3A2DX with
| B3A2Di | = 5.0002 and between B3 and Bi is B3A2B3 . 
with | B3A2Bi | = 5.0002.',
I
6. Now that Di and Bi are in Temp, we need to
consider the vertices cqnnected to them: B2, Bi 
and Ai. After we mark some of them, our candidates
are Aiz B2 and hosth.
7. Compare:
| B3A2hosth | =0.2'+ 5 = 5.2 
| B3A2BiB2 | = 1 + 5 + 0.0002 = 6.0002 
| B3A2BiAi | = 0.0002 + 5 + 5 = 10.0002
Because | B3A2hosth ] is smaller, we take hosth 
into Temp. Now Temp = {B3, A2, Diz Biz hosth} and
the shortest path between B3 and hosth is B3A2hosth 
with | B3A2hosth | =5.2.
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I8. Now that hosth is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to hosth: Aiz B2 and Di. After
we mark some of them, our candidates are Ai and B2.
9. Compare: i
I
I B3A2BiB2 I = 1 + 5' + 0.0002 = 6.0002
B3A2BiAi | = 0.00021 + 5 + 5 = 10.0002
B3A2hosthAi | = 5 + 0. 2 + 0.0002 = 5.2002
B3A2hosthB2 | = O.,2 + 5 + 0.2 = 5.4
Because | B3A2hosthAi | is smaller, we take Ai into 
Temp. Now Temp - {B3, A2> Dlz Biz hosth, Ax} and the
shortest path between B3' and Ai is B3A2hosthAi with
i
I B3A2hosthAi I = 5.2002. '
10. Now that Ai is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to Ai: hosth and Di. Since Di
and hosth have already been in the Temp, so our
candidate is only B2.
11. Compare:
| B3A2BiB2 | - 1 + 
| B3A2DiBiB2 | = 5
= 6
| B3A2hosthB2 | =0.2 
Because I B3A2hosthB2 I is
Temp. Now Temp = {B3, A2,
5 + 0.0002 = 6.0002
+ 0.0002 + 0.02 + 1
0202
+ 5 + 0.2 = 5.4
smaller, we take B2 into
Di, Bi, hosth, Ai, B2} and
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the shortest path between B3 and B2 is B3A2hosthB2 
with | B3A2hosthB2 ] =5.4.
I
Therefore we have found all the shortest paths
starting from agent B3, and ending to every other vertex.
We illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 18.
Figure 18. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for B3 as the 
Initial Vertex
Next, let us take Di as the initial vertex and try to 
find all the shortest paths starting from Di.I
1. Take the source vertex Di and put it in Temp.
Temp = {Di}
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2. Since Di connects to Bi and B3, we mark Bi and B3
as candidates. ’
3. Compare: ,
| DiBi | = 0.02 
| DiBa | = 0.2
Because | DiBi | is smaller, we take B3 into Temp. 
Now Temp = {Di, Bi) and we also get the shortest 
path between Di and Bi is DiBi with | D3B1 | = 0.02.
4. Since Bi is in Temp, now; we need to consider the 
vertices connected to Bx: Ai and B2. After we mark
them, our candidates are Alz B2 and B3.
i
5. Compare:
| DxBiAi | = 5 + 0.02 = 5.02 
[ DiBiB2 I = 0.02 + 1 = 1.02 
| DiB3 | = 0.2 i
Because | DiB3 | is smaller, we take B3 into Temp.
I
Now Temp = {Diz Blz B3} . 'The shortest path between 
Di and B3 is DiB3 with | D]B3 [ =0.2.
6. Now that B3 is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to it: A2. After we mark it,
our candidates are Aiz B2 and A2.
7. Compare:
I DiB]Ai I = 0.02 + 5 = 5.02 
| DiBiB2 | = 1 + 0.02 = 1.02
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I DXB3A2 I = 0.2 + 5 = 5.2
Because | DiBiB2 | is smaller, we take B2 into Temp 
Now Temp = {Dlz Bx, B3, B2} and the shortest path 
between Dx and B2 is DiBiB2 with | DiBiB2 | = 1.02.
8. Now that B2 is in Temp, ,we need to consider the
vertices connected to B2: Ai and Dx. After we mark
Ai, our candidates are Ax and A2.
9. Compare:
| D1B1A1 | = 0.02 +( 5 = 5.02 
| DxB3A2 [ = 0.2 + 5 = 5.2 
| DiBxB2Ai ] = 1 + 50 + 0.02 = 51.02
Because | DxBiAi | is smaller, we take Ax into Temp
I
Now Temp = {Dx, Bx, B3, B2, Ax} and the shortest
path between Dx and Ax is D1B1A1 with 
| D1B1A1 |=5.02.
10. Now that Ai is in Temp, we need to consider the
■I
vertices connected to Ai: hosth and Dx. Since Dx
has already been in the Temp, so our candidates
are A2 and hosth-
11. Compare:
[ DxB3A2 I = 5 + 0.2 = 5.2
| DiBiAihos thA2 | = 5 + 0.02 + 0.02 + 0.0002 
= -5.0,406
I DiB3A2hosth I = 0.2 + 5 + 0.02 = 5.22
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| DiBiAihosth | - 0.02 + 5 + 0.02 = 5.04. 
Because | DiBiAihosth [ is smaller, we take hosth 
into Temp. Now Temp = {Di, Bi, B3, B2, Ai, hosth} 
and the shortest path between Di and hosth is 
DiBiAihosth with | DiBiAihosth | - 5.04.
12. Now that hosth is in Temp, we need to consider the
vertices connected to hosth: A2, B3, B2, Ai and Bi.
Since most of them have already been in the Temp,
so our candidate is only A2.
13. Compare:
| DiB3A2 | = 5 + 0.2 = 5.2
t
| DiBiAihosthA2 | = 5 + 0.02 + 0.02 + 0.0002 
= 5.0)406
Because | DiBiAihosthA2 | is smaller, we take A2 
into Temp. Now Temp = {Di, Bi, B3, B2, Ai, hosth, A2}
and the shortest path between Di and A2 is 
DiBiAihosthA2 with | DiBiAihosthA2 | = 5.0406.
I
I
In this way we have found all the shortest paths
starting from agent Di, and ending to every other vertex.
We illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 19.
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It5= 0:02. /. . J, ,
Figure 19. Graph Showing Shortest Paths for Di as the 
Initial Vertex i
i
I
Finally, we are going to take hosth as the initial
1
vertex and try to find all the shortest paths starting
from hosth.
1. Take the source vertex hosth and put it in Temp.I
Temp - {hosth) 1
I2. Since hosth connects to every agent running on it 
in this example, we marine all of them as candidates.
3. Compare:
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■ | hosthBi | = 0.2
| hosthB2 | = 0.2 !
| hosthB3 | = 0.02
| hosthAi | = 0.00021
| hosthA2 | = 0.0002
| hosthDi | = 0.02
Because | hosthAi | = | hosthA2 | are the smallest,
we take Ai and A2 into Temp. Now Temp = {hosth, Aiz
A2}. We also get the shortest path between hosth
and Ai is hosthAi with I hosthAi = 0.0002 and the
shortest path between hosth and A2 is hosthA2 with
I
| hosthA2 | = 0.0002. ;
' i
4. Since Ax and A2 are in Temp, now we need to
consider the vertices connected to Ai and A2: Di
and Bi After we mark them, our candidates a]J
Bi, b2 and B3. i
Compare:
1 hosthBi | = 0.2
1 hosthB2 | = 0.2
1 hosthB3 | = 0.02
1 hosthA2Bi | = 0.0002 + 0.0002 =■ 0.0004
1 hosthA2Di | = 0.0002 + 0.0002 = 0.0004
1 hosthAiDi | = 0.0002 + 0.0002 = 0.0004
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Because | hosthA2Bi | = |' hosthA2Di | = | hosthAiDi | 
are the smallest, we take Bi and Dx into Temp. Now
Temp = {hosth, Ai, A2, Dlz Bi) . We also get the 
shortest path between hosth and Bi is hosthA2Bi 
with | hosthA2Bi | = 0.0004 and the shortest path 
between hosth and Dx is hosthA2Di withI
| hosthA2Di | - 0.0004 or hosthAiDi with 
| hosthAiDi | = 0.0004.
6. Now that Bi and Di are in Temp, we need to
consider the vertices connected to them: Ai, B2, Bi
B3. After we mark some of them, our candidates are
I
B2 and B3. (
7. Compare: '
i
| hosthB2 |=0.2 
| hosthB3 | = 0.02
| hosthDiB3 | = 0.02 + 0.2 = 0.22
I
| hosthA2BiB2 | = 0,0002 + 0.0002 + 1 = 1.0004 
| hosthAiDiBsl = 0.0002 + 0.2 = 0.2002
Because | hosthB3 | is smaller, we take B3 into 
Temp. Now Temp = {hosth, Ai, A2, Di, Bi, B3} and the
shortest path between hosth and B3 is hosthB3 with 
| hosthB3 | = 0.02 .
I
8. Now that B3 is in Temp, j we need to consider the 
vertices connected to B3: A2. Since A2 has already
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been in Temp, we do not .mark it. So our candidate
B2.
9. Compare: '
| hosthB2 | =0.2
| hosthA2B!B2 | = 0.0002 + 0.0002 + 1 = 1.0004 
Because | hosthB2 | is smaller, we take B2 into
I
Temp. Now Temp = {hosth,; Ai., A2, Diz Bi, B3, B2} and
I
the shortest path between hosth and B2 is hosthB2 
with | hosthB2 | =0.2. 1
In this way we have found all the shortest paths
starting from host hosth, and ending to every other vertex.
We illustrate those shortest paths in Figure 20.
Initial Vertex
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After all these steps, we have used this algorithm to
find the shortest paths between every pair of vertices of
the entire system.
The shortest minimum length path between any two
vertices represents the weakest security point and the 
longest shortest path describes'the ultimate time the
attacker needs to break the whole system at most. Here we
are more interested in the latter one and we have the
following definition.
Definition 14. The diameter of a security risk graph
is the length of the longest shortest path between any two
vertices.
In the above example, since | B3A2hosthB2 | = 5.4 is 
the longest shortest path for all the vertices. The 
diameter for this example is 5.,'4 weeks. The diameter can 
be used to represent the security level of the whole
I
system because it is the least ,time the attacker needs to
break into the whole system because it is the least time
i
needed for the toughest point in the whole system. Thus we
can use the diameters to compare the security of different
system. If after reconfiguration, the diameter of the 
whole system increases, we can say that the whole system's 
security increases.because the'time needed to break into 
the hardest point of the system increases.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
5.1 Conclusions
In this research, we have developed security models
to evaluate the security levels of the agent-based
distributed systems by giving a mathematical measure to 
tell how secure a system is. First, we presented the 
overview of the agent-based distributed systems, security 
evaluation of the distributed systems and the summary of
the related works. Then, by identifying the security
threats in the mobile-agent distributed systems, we 
developed a taxonomy of the security threats in the 
mobile-agent distributed systems. There are four types of 
security threats identified in the mobile-agent 
distributed systems from the point of view of the 
consequence of the security breaches. They are: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability and creditability 
And they are falling into four categories of security 
threats from the point of view of the relationships
between the actors in the agent-based systems: agent- 
against-host, agent-against-agent, host-against-agent and 
agent-against-network. To facilitate us analyzing and 
evaluating the security of the agent-based systems, we
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combine the agent-against-host and the agent-against-
network scenarios into towards-host category and the 
agent-against-agent and the host,-against-agent scenarios 
into towards-agent category. We defined the security risk 
graph as the basis of our research. By using the security 
risk graph, we can put the security threat relationships 
between agents and hosts, agents and agents and that of
hosts and hosts into a snapshot graph. After we have
divided the security threats and have set up the security 
risk graph to reflect the system's vulnerabilities, we 
developed a set of theories to analyze and simplify the 
graph so that we can do further calculation.
By using the simplified security risk graphs, we have
set up two models for the security evaluation of the!■
agent-based systems. One is a probabilistic model by using
Markov chain. Another one is a mathematical model based on
I
the shortest path. ,
In the probabilistic model, we calculated the Mean
Time To Failure to evaluate .the approximate time needed
for an intruder to reach the target. As we summarized in
the related works section, currently only Chan and Lyu'si
model [2] deals with agent-based system. Compared with 
their method, the . following* characteristics can be 
observed in our model:
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I• It is more generalized, and complete
The model developed in this paper not only can 
evaluate how secure an agent is, but also can evaluate 
the security of the host. While Chan and Lyu's method 
only considered about the security risk of agent.
• It is more practical and1feasible
The coefficient of malice and vulnerability 
proposed by Chan and Lyu [2] ,are hard and vague to be
I
obtained. While in our model, we first generate
!
Markov model from the privilege graph. Then the MTTF
can be calculated accurately by using the set of well- 
developed formulas for solving the . Markov Chain 
problem in reliability field.
Our method can be used to dynamically monitor the
I
security level of each host and agent in the system. 
Combined with the auditing log)history technology, each 
host can decide to accept an agent or not based on the 
corresponding.MTTF value and the credit history of this 
agent as well as its owner. Also, if we want to test 
some new technologies to improve the security, we can 
compare the MTTF before the 'experiment with that of 
after the test to see and analyze that if there is any
enhancement.
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While the Mean Time To Failure can provide a
stochastic evaluation of the intruder's performance, a
measurement of the whole system's security is also needed 
form the administrator's view of point. In the
mathematical model using the shortest path, the system's
administrator not only can evaluate the approximate breach 
success time (transition time) between any two vertices,
but also can evaluate the whole .system's security risk. 
Thus we can have a way to compare the security between
different systems.
This work demonstrated the .security measurement
models that can be used to evaluate the security levels 
between any two objects in the agent-based distributed 
systems as well as the whole system's security level.
These models can be used to monitor the security evolutionII
of the agents and hosts running ,in the system dynamically. 
They can also help the system administrators to manage the 
system's security and performance. The system
administrators can evaluate the effectiveness of different
configurations by comparing the values obtained from these
different configurations. ,
i
I
I
" I
I
1
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5.2 Future Directions
Even though we have achieved the objectives and goals
that we aimed in this thesis, there are still some points
needed to be addressed for future directions due to it
potential practical usefulness.
1
By monitoring the system's risks, we can get the
profile of the transition time ojf each type of security
risks. We plan to use some probabilistic model to process
the empirical data obtained from the observation.
Also, it would be desirable to apply some
probabilistic method to the time value from the
calculation so that it describes, the security measure more
accurately.
We plan to apply these models in Spider III, the
multi-agent distributed system
study its feasibility.
developed in CSUSB to
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